Previous studies suggest that factual learning, that is, learning from obtained outcomes, is biased, such that participants preferentially take into account positive, as compared to negative, prediction errors. However, whether or not the prediction error valence also affects counterfactual learning, that is, learning from forgone outcomes, is unknown. To address this question, we analysed the performance of two cohorts of participants on reinforcement learning tasks using a computational model that was adapted to test if prediction error valance influences learning. Concerning factual learning, we replicated previous findings of a valence-induced bias, whereby participants learned preferentially from positive, relative to negative, prediction errors. In contrast, for counterfactual learning, we found the opposite valence-induced bias: negative prediction errors were preferentially taken into account relative to positive ones. When considering valence-induced bias in the context of both factual and counterfactual learning, it appears that people tend to preferentially take into account information that confirms their current choice
of valence on both factual (α C+ >α C-; T(19)=6.2; P=6.9e-6) and counterfactual learning rates (α U->α U+ ; T(19)=5.7; P=0.0002) (Figure 2B right) .
To verify the robustness of this result in the context of different reward contingencies, we analysed learning rates in each task condition separately (Figure S1A) . We submitted Experiment 1 factual learning rates to a repeated-measure ANOVA with prediction error valence (positive and negative) and task condition as within-subjects factors (Figure S1B) . Confirming the aggregate result, the ANOVA showed a significant main effect of valence (F (1, 19) =26.4, P=5.8e-5), but no effect of condition (F(2,38)=0.7, P>0.5) and, crucially, no valence by condition interaction (F(2,38)=0.8, P>0.4). We submitted Experiment 2 factual and counterfactual learning rates to a repeated-measure ANOVA with prediction error valence (positive and negative), prediction error type (factual or counterfactual) and condition (Symmetric, Asymmetric and Reversal) as within-subjects factors (Figure S1C) . Confirming the aggregate result, the ANOVA showed no effect of valence (F (1, 19) =0.0, P>0.9), no effect of type (F (1, 19) =0.3, P>0.5), but a significant valence by type interaction (F (1, 19) =162.9, P=9.1e-11). We also found an effect of condition (F(2,38)=5.1, P=0.01), reflecting lower average learning rates in the Reversal compared to the Asymmetric condition (T (19) =2.99; P=0.007), which was not modulated by valence (F(2,38)=0.2, P>0.7), or type (F(2,38)=1.2, P>0.3). Crucially, the three-way interaction was not significant (F(2,38)=1.8, P>.1). These results indicate that learning biases were robust across different task contingencies.
Dimensionality reduction with model comparison
To further test our hypotheses and verify its parsimony, we ran a model comparison analysis including the 'Full' model (i.e., the model with four learning rates; Figure 1C ) and reduced versions of it ( Figure   3A) . The first alternative model was obtained by reducing the number of learning rates along the dimension of the outcome type (factional or counterfactual). This 'Information' model has only two learning rates: one for the obtained outcomes (α C ) and another for the forgone outcomes (α U ). The second alternative model was obtained by reducing the number of learning rates along the dimension of the outcome valence (positive or negative). This 'Valence' model has only two learning rates (one for the positive outcomes (α + ) and another for the negative outcomes (α -)) and should win according to the "positive valence bias" hypothesis. Finally, the third alternative model was obtained by reducing the learning rate as a function of the outcome event being confirmatory (positive obtained or negative forgone) or disconfirmatory (negative obtained and positive forgone). This 'Confirmation' model has only two learning rates (one for confirmatory outcomes (α CON ) and another for the disconfirmatory outcomes (α DIS )) and should win according to the "confirmation bias" hypothesis. BIC analysis indicated that the 'Full' model better accounted for the data compared to both the 'Information' and the 'Valence' models (both comparisons: T(19)>4.2; P<0.0005; Table 1 ). However the 'Confirmation' model better accounted for the data compared to the 'Full' model (T(19)=9.9;
P=6.4e-9). The posterior probability of the 'Confirmation' model was higher compared to the chance (.0.25 for a model space including 4 models; T(19)=13.5; P= 3.3e-11) and compared to that of all the other models (all comparison: T(19)>9.0; P<2.1e-8) and the learning rate for confirmative outcomes was significantly higher compared that for disconfirmatory events (α CON >α DIS ; T(19)=11.7; P=3.9e-10) ( Figure 3B and Figure 3C ). These results support the "confirmation bias" hypothesis and further indicate that, at least at the behavioural level, chosen and unchosen outcomes may be processed by the same learning systems.
Behavioural signatures of learning biases
To investigate the behavioural consequences of the learning biases we median-split all participants according their normalised learning rate differences. We reasoned that the effects of learning biases on behavioural performance could be highlighted comparing participants who differed in the extent they expressed the bias itself. Experiment 1 participants were split according to their normalised factual learning rate bias: learning rate bias:
, from which we also obtained a high (0.72±0.04) and a low bias (0.36±0.04) group.
In both experiments, our task included three different conditions (Figure S1A): a "Symmetric" condition, in which both options were associated with a 50% chance of getting a reward; an "Asymmetric" condition, in which one option was associated with a 75% chance of getting a reward, whereas the other option was associated with only a 25% chance; a "Reversal" condition, in which one option was initially associated with a 83% chance of getting a reward and the other option was associated with a 17% chance of getting a reward, but after 12 trials the contingency reversed. From the Symmetric condition we extracted preferred choice rate as a dependent variable, which was the choice rate of the most frequently chosen option (i.e. the option/symbol that was chosen more than >50%). We submitted the preferred choice rate to an ANOVA with experiment (1 or 2) and bias level (high and low) as between-subjects factors. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of bias level higher biases were associated with an increased tendency to develop a preferred choice, even in the absence of a "correct" option, which naturally emerges from overweighting positive outcomes (10) .
From the remaining conditions we extracted the correct choice rate, which was the choice rate of the most frequently rewarded option. In the Reversal condition, correct choice rate was split across the first (i.e., before the reversal of the contingencies) and second half (i.e., after the reversal of the contingencies) of the trial. We submitted the correct choice rate to a mixed ANOVA with experiment (1 or 2) and Bias Group (high and low) as between-subjects factors, and condition (Asymmetric, Reversal: first half, and Reversal: second half) as a within-subjects factor. We found a main effect of experiment (F(1,36)=4.1, P=0.05), indicating that correct choice rate was higher in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, which is consistent with previous studies showing that counterfactual feedback enhances learning (20, 23) . We also found a significant effect of bias level (F(1,36)=10.8, P=0.002), a 
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Discussion
Two cohorts of healthy adult participants performed two variants of an instrumental learning task, involving factual (Experiment 1) and counterfactual (Experiments 1 & 2) reinforcement learning. We found that prediction error valence biased factual and counterfactual learning in opposite directions.
When learning from obtained outcomes (factual learning), the learning rate for positive prediction errors was higher than the learning rate for negative prediction errors. When learning from forgone outcomes (counterfactual learning), the learning rate for positive prediction errors was lower than that of negative prediction errors. This result proved stable across different reward contingency conditions and was further supported by model comparison indicating that the most parsimonious model was a model with different learning rates for confirmatory and disconfirmatory events, regardless of outcome type (factual or counterfactual) and valence (positive or negative). Finally, model-free analysis showed that participants with a higher valence-induced learning bias displayed poorer learning performance, specifically when it was necessary to adjust their behaviour in response to a reversal of reward contingencies.
Our results demonstrating a factual learning bias replicate previous findings showing that in simple instrumental learning tasks, participants preferentially learn from positive compared to negative prediction errors (11) (12) (13) . However, in contrast to previous studies in which this learning bias had no negative impact on behavioural performance (i.e., correct choice rate and therefore final payoff), here we demonstrated that this learning bias is still present in situations where it has a negative impact on performance. In fact, whereas low and high bias participants performed equally well in conditions with stable reward contingencies, in conditions with unstable reward contingencies we found that high bias participants showed a relatively reduced correct choice rate. In the Reversal condition, learning to successfully reverse the response in the second half of the trials is mainly driven by negative factual (and positive counterfactual) prediction errors, however participants displaying higher biases presented a lower correct choice rate, specifically in the second half of the "Reversal" condition.
In addition to reduced reversal learning, and in accordance with a previous study (10) , another behavioural feature that distinguished higher and lower bias participants was the preferred response rate in the Symmetric condition. In the Symmetric condition, both cues had the same reward probabilities (50%), such that there was no intrinsic "correct" response, allowing us to calculate a "preferred" response rate for each participant (defined as the choice rate of the option most frequently selected by a given participant, i.e. the option selected in > 50% of trials). The preferred response rate can therefore be taken as a measure of the tendency to overestimate the value of one cue compared to the other, in the absence of actual outcome-based, factual evidence. In both experiments, higher bias participants showed higher preferred response rates, a behavioural pattern that is consistent with an increased tendency to discount negative factual (and positive counterfactual) prediction errors, which can result in one considering a previously rewarded chosen option as better than it really is and an increased preference for this choice.
Previous studies have so far been unable to distinguish whether this valence-induced factual learning bias was a valuation or a confirmation bias. In other words, do participants preferentially learn from positive prediction errors because they are positively valenced or because the outcome "confirms" the choice they have just made? To address this question we designed Experiment 2, where, by the inclusion of counterfactual feedback, we were able to separate the influence of valence (positive vs.
negative) from the influence of choice (chosen vs. unchosen). Crucially, whereas the two competing hypotheses ("valuation" vs. "confirmation") predict the same result concerning factual leaning rates, they predict opposite effects of valence on counterfactual learning rates. The results from Experiment 2 support the "confirmation" bias hypothesis: participants preferentially took into account the outcomes that "confirmed" their current behavioural policy (positive chosen and negative unchosen outcomes) and discounted the outcomes that contradicted it (negative chosen and positive unchosen outcomes). Our results therefore support the idea that confirmation biases are pervasive in human cognition (24) .
It should be noted that, from an orthodox Bayesian perspective, a "confirmation bias" would involve reinforcing one's own initial beliefs or preferences. Previous studies have investigated how prior information -in the form of explicit task instructions or advice -influences the learning of reinforcement statistics and have provided evidence of a confirmation bias (25) (26) (27) . However, consistent with our study, their computational and neural results suggest that this instruction-induced confirmation bias operates at the level of outcome processing and not at the level of initial preferences nor at the level of the decision-making process (28, 29) . Here, we take a slightly different perspective by extending the notion of confirmation to the implicit reinforcement of one's own current choice, independently from explicit prior information, by preferentially learning from desirable outcomes.
We performed our learning rate analysis separately for each task condition and the results proved robust and not driven by any particular reward contingency condition. While our results contrast with previous studies that have found learning rates adapted as a function of task contingencies, showing increases when task contingencies were unstable (30, 31) , several differences between these tasks and ours may explain this discrepancy. First, in previous studies the stable and unstable phases were clearly separated, whereas in our design participants were simultaneously tested with the three reward contingency conditions. Second, in our experiments we did not explicitly tell participants to monitor the stability of the reward contingency. Finally, since in our task the Reversal condition represented only fourth quarter of the trials, participants may not have explicitly realized that changing learning rates were adaptive in some cases.
To date, two different views of counterfactual learning have been proposed in the literature. In one view, factual and counterfactual learning are underpinned by different systems that could be computationally and anatomically mapped into subcortical -model-free -and prefrontal -model-based processed by the same learning system, involving the dopaminergic nuclei and their projections (33) (34) (35) . Our dimensionality reduction model comparison result sheds new light on this debate. According to the first view that factual and counterfactual learning are based on different systems, different learning rates for positive and negative prediction errors would have better accounted the data (the 'Information' model). On the contrary, the winning model assumes the learning process is different across desirable and undesirable outcomes but shared across obtained and forgone outcomes (the 'Confirmation' model), which supports the view that factual and counterfactual learning are different facets of the same system.
Why do these learning biases have an overall maladaptive value? One possibility is that these learning biases are maladaptive, but they arise from neurobiological constraints, which limit human learning capacity. However, we believe this interpretation is unlikely because we see no clear reason why such limits would differentially affect learning from positive and negative prediction errors. In other words, we would predict that a neurobiological constraint on learning rate would limit all learning rates in a similar way and therefore not produce valence-induced learning asymmetries.
A second possibility is that these learning biases are not maladaptive. For instance it has been shown that in certain reward conditions agents displaying valence-induced learning bias may outperform unbiased agents (9) . Thus, a possible explanation for these learning biases is that they have been positively selected because they can be adaptive in the context of the natural environment in which the learning system evolved (36) .
Finally, a third, intermediate possibility is that these learning biases can be maladaptive in the context of learning performance, but due to their adaptive effects in other domains of cognition, overall they have a net adaptive value. For example, these biases may also manifest as "self-serving", choicesupportive biases, which result in individuals tending to ascribe success to their own abilities and efforts, but relatively tending to neglect failures (37) . These psychological processes may help nourish self-esteem and confidence, both of which have been associated with overall favourable real life outcomes (38) . (1)
In this first equation, ! is the prediction error of the chosen option, calculated as:
where ! was the reward obtained as an outcome of choosing at trial . In other words, the prediction error ! is the difference between the expected outcome ! and the actual outcome ! .
In Experiment 2 the unchosen option value was also updated according to following rule (counterfactual learning module):
In this second equation, ! is the prediction error of the unchosen option, calculated as:
where ! was the reward that could have been obtained as an outcome of having chosen at trial . In other words, the prediction error ! is the difference between the expected outcome ! and the actual outcome ! of the unchosen option.
The learning rates ! ! and ! ! are scaling parameters that adjust the amplitude of value changes from one trial to the next when prediction errors of chosen and unchosen option respectively are positive (when the actual reward ( ) is better than the expected reward ( )) and the learning rates ! ! and ! ! do the same when prediction errors are negative. Thus, our model allows for the amplitude of the update to be different following positive and negative prediction errors and for both chosen and unchosen options. It therefore allows for the existence of valence-dependent learning biases.
Finally, the probability (or likelihood) of selecting the chosen option was estimated with a the soft-max rule as follow:
This is a standard stochastic decision rule that calculates the probability of selecting one of a set of options according to their associated values. The temperature, , is another scaling parameter that adjusts the stochasticity of decision-making.
In addition to this 'Full' model, we also considered versions with a reduced number of learning rates ( Figure 3A) 
, and a model where an additional parameter -Inf < π < +Inf biases the decisionmaking process by increasing (positive values) or decreasing (negative values) the likelihood of repeating the same choice, regardless of the previous outcome ( Table 1 ). degrees of freedom. The "winning" model is the "Confirmation", whose learning rates are displayed in Figure 3C .The second best model is the "Full" model, whose learning rates are displayed in Figure 2C . 
Parameter optimization and model comparison
In a first analysis, we optimized model parameters by minimizing the negative log-likelihood of the data, given different parameter settings, using Matlab's fmincon function (ranges: 0<β<Infinite, and 0< α n <1):
Negative log-likelihoods (LL) were used to compute at the individual level (random effects) for each model the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), as follows:
= log * + 2 * BIC where compared between biased and unbiased models to verify that the utilization of the biased model is justified, even accounting for its extra-complexity. As an approximation of the model evidence, individual BICs were fed into the mbb-vb-toolbox(39), a procedure that estimates the expected frequencies and the exceedance probability for each model within a set of models, given the data gathered from all participants. Expected frequency is a quantification of the posterior probability of the model (denoted PP), i.e. the probability of the model generating the data obtained from any randomly selected participant. Exceedance probability (denoted XP) is the probability that a given model fits the data better than all other models in the set, i.e. has the highest PP ( Table 1) .
In a second analysis, we optimized model parameters by minimizing the logarithm of the Laplace approximation to the model evidence (or log posterior probability: LPP):
Because LPP maximization includes priors over the parameters (temperature: gamma(1.2,5); learning rates beta(1.1,1.1)) (REF), it avoids degenerate parameter, estimates. Therefore, learning rates analyses have been performed on the values retrieved with this procedure. To avoid bias in learning rate comparison, the same priors were used for all learning rates. In the main analysis, a single set of parameters was used to fit all conditions. In a control analysis, different sets of parameters were used to fit each condition ("Symmetric", "Asymmetric" and "Reversal").
Parameter recovery
To validate our results, and more specifically to verify that valence-induced differences in learning rates reflect true differences in learning, as opposed to an artefact of the parameter optimization procedure, we checked the capacity of recovering the correct parameters in simulated datasets. To do so, we simulated performance on our behavioural task by virtual participants with different learning rates ( Fig. S2 & Fig. S3 ). Concerning Experiment 1, we simulated unbiased ( ! ! = ! ! ) and biased ( ! ! > ! ! ) participants. Concerning Experiment 2, we simulated unbiased ( ! ! = ! ! and ! ! = ! ! ), semi-biased ( ! ! > ! ! and ! ! = ! ! ) and biased ( ! ! > ! ! and ! ! > ! ! ) participants. We simulated N=100 virtual participants per set of parameter. The results of these analyses are presented in the supplementary materials and confirm the capacity of our parameter optimization procedure to correctly recover the true parameters, regardless to presence (or absence) of biases ( Fig. S2 and Fig. S3 ). (A) Predicted results. Based on previous studies we expected that in Experiment 1 factual learning would display a "positive valence" bias (i.e. the learning rate for the chosen positive outcomes would be relatively higher than higher than that of the chosen negative outcomes ( ! ! > ! ! ). In Experiment 2, one possibility was that this "positive valence" bias would extend to counterfactual learning, whereby positive outcomes are over-weighted regardless of whether the outcome was chosen or unchosen ("valuation" bias) ( ! ! > ! ! ). Another possibility was that counterfactual learning would present an opposite bias, whereby the learning rate for the unchosen negative outcomes was higher than the learning rate of the unchosen positive outcomes ( ! ! < ! ! ) ("confirmation" bias). (B) Actual results.
Learning rate analysis of Experiment 1 replicated previous findings, demonstrating that factual learning presents a "positive valence", or "optimistic" bias. Learning rate analysis of Experiment 2 indicated that counterfactual learning was also biased, in a direction that was consistent with a "confirmation" bias. ***P<0.001 and *P<0.05, two-tailed paired t-test. "True values": learning rates used to simulate the data. "Recovered values": learning rates obtained from the simulations once the same parameter optimization was applied as for the experimental data.
"Case: unbiased": no learning rate bias. "Case: biased": optimistic learning rate bias.
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Supplementary Figure 3 : parameter recovery in the Experiment 2 setting.
"True values": learning rates used to simulate the data. "Recovered values": learning rates obtained from the simulations once applied the same parameter optimization as for the experimental data.
"Case: unbiased": no learning rate bias. "Case: semi-biased": learning rate bias only concerning factual learning. "Case biased": confirmation bias involving both factual and counterfactual learning.
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